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APPENDIX 1-F
ITEM 14

26 August 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: CIA Trunk-Line Communications Facilities

1. Reference is made to memorandum dated 24 March 1948 from the Director to the ADSO, and reply thereto dated 8 April 1948 (copies attached), relative to base communications centers. This memorandum and the attached map constitute a report of progress to date in the establishment of CIA radio carrier facilities and of the future program, both firm and tentative. The Director's approval and/or comments on the program are requested.
2. Since the submission of the previous memorandum, the scope and types of covert CIA activities have been greatly expanded and the problems involved in communications support thus have become considerably clearer. There has resulted a much greater emphasis upon the necessity for CIA operated and controlled trunk-line facilities. It is apparent that the facilities of the Armed Services will not be adequate in times of emergency to effect transmission of CIA traffic in such a manner as to permit proper exercise by the Director of his command functions. The following paragraphs list present and proposed base stations with comments on the status of each:
 - a. Washington Base Station was initially established to serve the Latin American network only. It originally consisted of a receiver station only, utilizing U. S. Navy transmitters at Annapolis. By October 1949, the companion transmitter station will be in operation and per agreement, the use of U. S. Navy transmitters will be discontinued. Some expansion of the U. S. Washington Base Station will be required to enable it to serve as a terminus for traffic from Europe and the Middle East, in addition to Latin America, but it is shown on the accompanying map in blue because enlargement rather than total reconstruction would be required.
 - b. Base Station. Because continuous radio service throughout a 24 hour day is impossible across the North Atlantic, it is necessary to connect Washington with some Southern point, preferably not farther East . The soundest radio planning calls for a base . This base should be given top priority after those which are already under construction. In addition, an would provide the only available backup base for covert stations in Northern and Northeastern Europe, should our projected base be lost by enemy action.

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25X1 c. The [] Base is shown on the map as under construction.
25X1 This is planned as a mobile base for which equipment and vehicles are in the
25X1 process of construction, and on which negotiations []
[] are progressing favorably. It is hoped that this
base will be ready for operation in the Spring or Summer of 1950.

25X1 d. [] Base Station: This existing "cold war" base is being en-
25X1 larged to insure proper support of expanding cover operations behind the
Iron Curtain and to provide capacity [] The activities
of this station could result in a considerable expenditure of Russian tech-
nician manpower should countermeasures be initiated by them. Under emergency
conditions, this station could serve as a backup relay point for handling
25X1 traffic to and from the Middle East, provided security barriers resulting
from the different [] of stations in each area could be surmounted
or had to be disregarded due to the urgency of the traffic.

25X1 e. [] Base Station. This station is now under construction and
25X1 should be completed in six to eight months. As soon as completed, the
25X1 Middle East network will be reoriented [] and, of far more importance,
25X1 [] will undertake the covert support of Eastern Mediterranean, including
25X1 [] Radio communications between Washington [] are planned by
25X1 direct circuit as soon as [] base is in operation and necessary
25X1 frequency channels for such service are obtained. This circuit should be
replaced by relay through [] base as soon as that station is activated.

25X1 f. [] Base Stations. The planning for more adequate
25X1 support of Middle and Western Mediterranean operations by establishment of
base facilities at these locations will be undertaken at a later date, since
the establishment of [] Base and the reconstruction of Far Eastern
communications have priority. In addition, the uncertainty as to friendly
long term political control of each location limits present action to
general planning.

25X1 g. Far Eastern Base Facilities. Both planning and construction must
25X1 be made as flexible as possible due to the changing political picture in
25X1 the area. Distances and operational considerations dictate the early
construction of a major base in some politically tenable area, preferably
[] with small stations capable of rapid
25X1 movement at other locations []
25X1 [] A reserve of small stations would be held at the main
base.

25X1 h. Long range planning includes a second major Far Eastern Base,
25X1 established if possible [] for the support of operations in Central
and Southeastern Asia and as a link in the CIA global carrier system. As
25X1 planning and operations progress, small stations may be required at such
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i. A Central [] Relay Station. Future planning includes this station as the final base in the world-wide CIA system for handling of intelligence reports and necessary administrative traffic.

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25X1

4. In addition to the facilities described above, a limited number of mobile and air-transportable base stations are being procured for rapid dispatch to areas requiring immediate base facilities under emergency conditions, or to supplement or replace facilities damaged by enemy action, or to meet immediate operational requirements which cannot be serviced by the then existing base facilities.

5. Since this paper is a report on trunk-line facilities, no attempt has been made to show present or projected clandestine agent circuits, or special operational stations the activities of which require secure and rapid communications with Washington. However, the locations of the base stations listed have been selected only on the basis of closest coordination with operational planning.

6. The establishment of CIA trunk-line facilities outlined above is dependent upon the allocation to this organization of necessary frequencies for connecting these major radio communications centers. The frequency requirements will be presented initially by the Communications Division through existing channels, but it is anticipated that allocations of the magnitude involved will necessitate action by the Director at the highest governmental levels. A specific memorandum on the latter subject will be forwarded upon completion of the initial investigation.

7. The program herein is concurred in by the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination.

25X1

[]
Assistant Director
Special Operations

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24 March 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant Director for Special Operations

I seem to remember that one of the difficulties in controlling underground and subversive groups in the early stages of the European war was due to the fact that the base communications centers were not located and on the beam with the radio sets in the hands of underground units.

It seems to me we should investigate this condition at once with the view to possibly locating a base radio communication center

If I am correct in these assumptions it is suggested that the matter be discussed with the proper Air Force officials and the project initiated as early as possible in order that we may utilize funds now available.

I would like to have your comment or report on this matter as soon as anything can be reported.

R. H. HILLENKOTTER
Rear Admiral, USN
Director of Central Intelligence

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April 8, 1948

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

Reference: Memo for Assistant Director for Special Operations,
dated 24 March 1948

1. For communication planning purposes, the Office of Special Operations has proceeded on the following bases:

- a. To provide secure means of communications for intelligence reports throughout the world during normal peacetime.
- b. To provide continuous and secure means of communications for intelligence reports in areas of local political trouble or where normal facilities are inadequate.
- c. To train and recommend location of radio operators to stay behind in case of invasion.
- d. To establish and maintain communications bases for the control of agent, stay-behind or clandestine radio operators.
- e. To provide, in the event of war, continuous and secure means of communications for intelligence reports throughout the world and from the scene of action for the period immediately following the outbreak of hostilities (a matter of weeks and perhaps months). This is to be expanded during the war to long-term strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence in the immediate support of combat units.

2. The basic responsibilities outlined above are met by utilizing existing facilities where such facilities are adequate or approach satisfactory service, by supplementing existing facilities in some cases where such action can be taken, and by providing facilities when non-existent. The practice of not duplicating existing facilities, except when definitely required to afford security for emergency usage, dictates the extent to which CIA installations are made.

3. So far, the Communications Division, OSO, through liaison with State, War, and Navy Departments, has established continuous and secure facilities throughout the world, either by using existing facilities or by supplementing them where necessary. The supplementary stations established to date have been located in an attempt to carry out the basic assumptions. It must be recognized that the job of establishing normal peacetime facilities has had first priority and that wartime aspects of our responsibilities have not been fully met.

4. The problem of having communications bases available to support clandestine radio operations has led to the establishment by CIA of three main communications bases overseas, one in Europe, one in the Middle East, and one in the Far East. The bases in the Middle and Far East have several sub-bases operating under them. The problem is not completely solved by these stations, and it is believed that at least one more station should be added to the networks.

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25X1 5. The base station in Europe was to provide a communications control
25X1 point for Europe, [] and to relay the traffic back to the
25X1 U. S. To accomplish this, []

25X1 [] For added security and to utilize Army trans-Atlantic facilities,
25X1 the ultimate location was decided [] Until this
25X1 could be activated, a temporary base was established [] which has
25X1 recently been shifted [] This base handles the normal daily com-
munications services to OSO installations in Europe and serves as a training area
for agents and stay-behind operators for this area. In the event of an emergency,
this base would provide an emergency radio terminal and relay point for Europe,
and would service clandestine operations until overrun.

25X1 6. The Middle East Base Station, [] controls
25X1 a network of sub-base stations throughout the area and serves as a relay station
25X1 to the U. S. [] The location of this base
25X1 station was originally planned [] but due to the op-
25X1 position encountered, was situated [] There is now some indication that
25X1 [] desires the station removed. This base station and its sub-
25X1 bases handle the CIA [] traffic for this area and can, in the
event of emergency, service limited clandestine operations in the Middle and
Near East and the Balkans.

7. The problem of relocating the Middle East Base Station has been studied
with several possible solutions being presented as follows:

25X1 8. Since both the European Base Station and the present Middle East Base
station can be expected to be useful only during peacetime, a rear echelon base
station should be considered and established. The following locations have been
considered with results as follows:

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